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Abstract
We ﬁrst observe that two of Maskin’s results do not extend beyond three players:
we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose
unique solution is ineﬃcient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has
a unique eﬃcient solution for each ordering of the players, but for which the payoﬀ
vector obtained by averaging these solutions over the diﬀerent orderings does not
coincide with the Shapley value. On the other hand, we reinforce Maskin’s insight
that externalities may play a crucial role in generating ineﬃciency. Many existing
solutions on how to share proﬁts assume or derive the property of eﬃciency. Yet
we argue that players may have an interest to choose with whom to bargain. We
illustrate how this may trigger ineﬃciency, especially in the presence of externalities,
even if bargaining among any group of agents results in an eﬃcient distribution
of the surplus they can produce. We also provide some suﬃcient conditions for
eﬃciency.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C7, D62
Keywords: externalities, coalition formation, Shapley value
1 Introduction
Eric Maskin devoted his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society (Maskin (2003))
to the study of cooperation in the presence of externalities. He considers the model of
a partition function, a simple extension of the characteristic function where the proﬁt of
a coalition may vary with the coalitions that form in the complement (Thrall and Lucas
(1963)). Inspired by a speciﬁc class of bargaining procedures, one for each possible or-
dering of the bargainers, Maskin introduces a new solution that determines the coalitions
that form, and how the surplus is shared among their members.
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1Two main insights (obtained after proving existence and providing a characterization
of an appealing set of equilibria) delivered by Maskin’s procedure are as follows:1
• (1) The grand coalition forms if externalities are nonpositive, while ineﬃcient out-
comes may prevail if externalities are positive.
• (2) The average of the players’ payoﬀs over all the possible orderings coincides with
the Shapley value when externalities are absent.
The second part of Insight (1) is surprising, to the extent that in the cooperative ap-
proach to game theory, eﬃciency has been often assumed as an axiom for superadditive
situations. Insight (2), on the other hand, speaks to the “legitimacy” of the ﬁrst, in the
sense that it is obtained with a procedure that would still yield one of the classic solutions
in the no-externality domain.
Maskin proves that these results hold when restricting attention to three-player par-
tition functions. In Section 2, we begin by pointing out that, for more than three players,
additional assumptions beyond superadditivity are required to obtain these results in
Maskin’s bargaining procedure. Speciﬁcally, Example 1 considers a four-player partition
function with nonpositive externalities for which the grand coalition does not form in
its unique Maskin solution (for some ordering of the players), and Example 2 describes
another four-player game without externalities for which the grand coalition forms in its
unique solution for each ordering of the players, but the average of the payoﬀs is not the
Shapley value.
Nevertheless, Section 3 in this paper makes the case that insights (1) and (2) –
eﬃciency when externalities are “small” relative to the grand coalition surplus and in-
eﬃciencies under positive externalities, in models that yield the Shapley value with no
external eﬀects– can be obtained in many settings. To do so, instead of relying on a
particular bargaining procedure, we turn to a more general approach. This generality
stems from two considerations:
• (i) in the coalition formation stage, one can use a plethora of solution concepts
(such as dominant coalition structures, the core, or the subgame perfect equilibria
of a class of non-cooperative sequential procedures), and
• (ii) when a coalition structure is formed, the payoﬀs to players can be determined by
a large class of solutions, as long as they are consistent with axioms characterizing
the Shapley value of games without externalities. These axioms include eﬃciency,
anonymity and some form of marginalism, as explored in de Clippel and Serrano
(2008), thereby covering all solutions identiﬁed through axiomatic extensions of the
Shapley value; see the references of that paper for a detailed list.
That externalities may be a source of ineﬃciency seems at odds with many alternative
models that have been designed to better understand cooperation in these environments.
1Maskin (2003) restricts attention to superadditive partition functions, in which the surplus created
by the grand coalition exceeds the sum of those created by any partition thereof. We shall do the same
here.
2From a non-cooperative point of view, the various procedures studied by Macho-Stadler
et al. (2006) and Hafalir (2007) all lead to an eﬃcient outcome whether externalities
are present or not. A straightforward application of Hart and Mas-Colell’s (1996) or
P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein’s (2001) arguments to partition functions also leads to the
formation of the grand coalition. From an axiomatic point of view, division rules, also
called values, are required to be eﬃcient in most, if not all, existing works. Indeed, why
consider the possibility of leaving some proﬁt undistributed when designing a value?
The idea we develop in Section 3 is that, even if proﬁts are shared eﬃciently within
each coalition, ineﬃciency may occur because players may ﬁnd it in their best interest
to restrict the set of players with whom to bargain. Thus, we shall study a two-stage
game. Players decide with whom to negotiate in a ﬁrst stage. Bargaining on how to share
the proﬁt takes place in a second stage, as soon as a coalition structure has cristalized.
Driven by a concern of deriving robust qualitative results, we will consider a large class
of solutions that encompass both non-cooperative and axiomatic ideas (as in items (i)
and (ii) above).
Our ﬁndings are as follows:
• (a) The presence of externalities may be a robust cause of ineﬃciency when players
strategize to decide with whom to negotiate. But other culprits for ineﬃciencies
exist: in general, the “Coase theorem logic” does not necessarily apply in our
framework because the players’ hands are tied by the bargaining procedure or the
axioms behind the value when deciding with whom to bargain.
• (b) By construction, when no externalities are considered, our predictions agree
with the Shapley value if the grand coalition forms, or with the Shapley value of
each relevant subgame otherwise.
• (c) We provide suﬃcient conditions on the partition function under which the grand
coalition is eﬃcient and the unique dominant partition. A dominant partition, when
it exists, provides a very robust prediction of the coalitions that should form, pretty
much independent of the solution concept employed in the coalition formation stage.
In conclusion, Maskin’s Insights (1) and (2) are compatible with numerous scenarios of
coalition formation and externalities.
2 Some Limits to Maskin’s General Results
Maskin’s solution is inspired by a speciﬁc bargaining protocol. Cooperation builds up in
many steps as bargaining unfolds. Given an exogenous ordering, the ﬁrst player oﬀers to
the next one a monetary compensation in order to become his representative in further
negotiations. If the second player accepts, then the ﬁrst player will proceed in the same
way with the third player. If, on the other hand, the second player refuses, then the ﬁrst
two players will compete for the representation of the third player. Competition here
means that both players will simultaneously make a monetary oﬀer to the third player
3for his cooperation. That third player will then have the option to either accept one of
the two oﬀers, or none at all. The bargaining game goes on in this way, buying out the
cooperation of players through the competition of coalitional leaders, until the last player
in the ordering receives some oﬀer and decides which one to accept, if any. The coalitional
leaders then choose collective actions so as to maximize proﬁts (given the other coalitions
formed), and fulﬁll the contracts they signed by paying the players that agreed to sub-
ordinate their actions. Assuming that the environment is quasilinear, there is no loss of
generality to restrict attention to partition functions to summarize the coalitional proﬁt
anticipated by each coalition, as a function of the coalition structure that forms, instead
of describing explicitly the strategic options available to each coalition, and their conse-
quences. Maskin’s solution to the problem of cooperation in partition functions coincides
with a subset of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining procedure
just described: a speciﬁc equilibrium of the competition game between coalitional leaders
is selected, whose outcome is that of a second-price auction played in dominant strate-
gies. It should be easy to follow the computations hereafter without introducing further
notations to deﬁne Maskin’s solution more formally. The interested reader is referred to
Maskin (2003) for details.
Maskin (2003, Theorem 2) states that his solution is eﬃcient (the grand coalition
forms) if externalities are non-positive. The proof is given under the assumption that
there are only three players. The next example implies that additional assumptions are
required to obtain this result in Maskin’s procedure if there are more than three players.
Example 1 Consider the following four-player characteristic function:2 v({i}) = 0 for
each player i, v({a,c}) = 1, v({a,d}) = 10, v({c,d}) = 30, v({a,c,d}) = 31, v({a,b}) =
v({b,d}) = 40, v({a,b,d}) = 41, v({b,c}) = 100, v({b,c,d}) = v({a,b,c}) = 101,
v({a,b,c,d}) = 120. Notice that the game is (strictly) superadditive. Consider the natural
ordering [abcd]. There is a subgame perfect equilibrium (satisfying Maskin’s reﬁnement)
with player d joining a for a price of 1, and player c joining b for free. The ﬁnal payoﬀ is
(9,100,0,1) and is ineﬃcient. We check the equilibrium conditions starting from the last
subgames. Consider the competition between a and coalition {b,c} for player d. Player
b does not want to outbid player a, because the contribution of player d to coalition
{b,c} equals 1. Player a does not want to lower his bid because he gets a null payoﬀ
without the cooperation of player d. Consider now players a and b competing for c. If
player a proposes a strictly positive bid, then b will win player d in the next step, as
v({b,d}) − v({b}) = 40 > 30 = v({a,c,d}) − v({a,c}). Player a ends up with a payoﬀ
lower than 1, which is worse than 9, his equilibrium payoﬀ. We move backwards to the
ﬁrst stage. We know that player b gets 100 if he refuses the oﬀer from a (this is on
the equilibrium path). Is player a better oﬀ by proposing a higher payoﬀ to player b?
Suppose that player a gets player b. If player c refuses an oﬀer from player a in the next
round, then they will compete for player d. Player c will win player d for a price of 1,
as v({c,d}) − v({c}) = 30 > 1 = v({a,b,d}) − v({a,b}). Hence, player a must oﬀer a
2Ineﬃciency would prevail, even if the example was slightly modiﬁed so as to have strictly negative
externalities.
4compensation of at least 29 to player c if he wants to attract him. Otherwise, player a
stays with b, and c goes with d. Player a gets a negative payoﬀ in both cases.
Maskin (2003, Theorem 3) states that the average of the players’ payoﬀs over the
diﬀerent orderings coincides with the Shapley value in the absence of externalities. Again,
the proof assumes that there are only three players. One may be tempted to think that the
result follows from the fact that Maskin’s payoﬀ vectors would coincide with the marginal
contribution vectors, as the Shapley value is known to coincide with the average of the
marginal contribution vectors. Actually this ﬁrst intuition is false, as can be checked by
computing the marginal contribution vectors in Maskin (2003, Example 1). Yet, it turns
out, quite surprisingly, that the sum of Maskin’s payoﬀ vectors over the two orderings
where i is last coincides with the sum of the two marginal contribution vectors over these
same orderings, hence providing an alternative proof of Maskin’s result for three-player
characteristic functions. But this coincidence does not extend beyond three players. We
already know from our ﬁrst example that Maskin (2003, Theorem 3) cannot hold in
general with more than three players, since the average of his payoﬀ vectors is ineﬃcient
in that example. One could still hope that the result holds provided that the average is
eﬃcient. The following example implies that further assumptions are needed.
Example 2 Consider the following characteristic function: v({a,b,c,d}) = 10, v({a,b,c}) =
9, v({a,b,d}) = 8, v({a,c,d}) = 7, v({b,c,d}) = 6, v({a,b}) = v({a,c}) = v({a,d}) = 1






























The sum of the MA vectors equals (72,64,56,48), while the sum of the MC vectors equals
(78,62,54,46). These sums are diﬀerent because v({a,b}), v({a,c}) and v({a,d}) are
relatively small and therefore do not inﬂuence the computation of the MA vector. Actu-
ally, the vectors in the middle column coincide with the MA vectors of the game v0 where
5v0({a,b}) = v0({a,c}) = v0({a,d}) = 0 and v0(S) = v(S) for all the other coalitions S.
Their mean coincides with the Shapley value of the game v0. The Shapley value, on the
other hand, is sensitive to the modiﬁcation of the worth of coalitions {a,b}, {a,c} and
{a,d}. The power of player a is increased and therefore he gets two additional units of
surplus from each of the other players.
3 Choosing with Whom to Negotiate
We study a two-stage cooperation process. Players ﬁrst choose with whom they want to
negotiate. The outcome of this ﬁrst stage is a coalition structure Π. Payoﬀs are then
determined within each atom of Π in the second stage by applying a value. The process
can be solved by backward induction. To this end, we next discuss both values for a
given coalitional structure, and solutions to the coalition formation problem.
3.1 Payoﬀ Distribution for a Given Coalition Structure
Suppose that a coalition structure Π, not necessarily the grand coalition, has materialized,
meaning that players within each atom S of Π have agreed to negotiate with each other,
and with no agents from other atoms. For coalition S ∈ Π, we thus have to restrict
attention to the partition function v(S,Π) derived from v as follows: v(S,Π)(S0,Π0) :=
v(S0,Π0∪Π−S), for each embedded coalition (S0,Π0) deﬁned over S. A plethora of models
can be applied to ﬁgure out the payoﬀ distribution for each S ∈ Π. Indeed, a host of linear
and even non-linear values that have been proposed satisfy the properties of eﬃciency,
anonimity and weak marginality, as deﬁned in de Clippel and Serrano (2008). It follows
from our previous work that they all coincide on the class of partition functions with
symmetric externalities.3 All these values are also monotonic, again in the sense of de
Clippel and Serrano (2008). This implies that they all fall within some common bounds
that emerge from the resolution of a linear programming problem, even if they do not all
coincide when externalities are not symmetric.
Formally, an (S,Π)-value is a function σ(S,Π) that assigns to every partition function
v (deﬁned for the grand coalition N) a unique utility vector σ(S,Π)(v) ∈ RS. It is then
straightforward to phrase the properties of (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency, Weak
(S,Π)-Marginality, and (S,Π)-Monotonicity, as in de Clippel and Serrano (2008), simply
by thinking of S as a grand coalition on its own, whose members are taking Π−S as given.




i (v) = v(S,Π). The details
are left to the interested reader. Let ShS denote the Shapley value for characteristic
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[v(T) − v(T−i)]
3Externalities that do not depend on players’ names, but only on the cardinality of the sets of players
aﬀected.
6for each player i ∈ S, and each characteristic function v deﬁned over S. We can then
rephrase the ﬁrst two propositions of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) as follows:
Proposition 1 Let σ(S,Π) be an (S,Π)-value that satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-
Eﬃciency, and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality. Let u be a symmetric partition function, and





i (vS), where vS is the
reduced characteristic function deﬁned over S by vS(T) = v(T), for each T ⊆ S.
Proposition 2 If σ(S,Π) is an (S,Π)-value that satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency,
and (S,Π)-Monotonicity, then one can solve a linear programming problem as in de Clip-
pel and Serrano (2008, Section 4) so as to ﬁnd two real numbers µ
(S,Π)











for each i ∈ S.
3.2 Solutions to the Problem of Coalition Formation
Our next task is to suggest how coalition structures form in the ﬁrst place. Let x be
the function that summarizes the outcome of the second stage of the process, as broadly
discussed in the previous subsection. It is thus a function that associates a vector in
RN to each coalition structure. With our approach, we ﬁx a list (σ(S,Π)) of values, and
xi(Π) = σ
(S,Π)
i (v), for each coalition structure Π, and each player i, with S being the
atom of Π to which i belongs.
We focus now on the question of coalition formation. One advantage of our approach
is the relative simplicity of this problem, because the players’ ﬁnal payoﬀs are given as
a function of the coalitions that form.4 Still, diﬀerent scenarios may lead to diﬀerent
outcomes. We articulate our arguments around three solutions.
(i) The ﬁrst solution is extremely appealing, when it exists. Coalition S is strictly




for each i ∈ S, each partition Π that contains S, and each partition Π0 that does not
contain S. If S is strictly dominant, we can be conﬁdent that it will form in frictionless
scenarios of coalition formation.5 Assuming that S forms, there may now be another
coalition that is strictly dominant for the remaining players (i.e., in N \ S). Continuing
in this fashion may lead to a unique partition. A partition Π is strictly dominant if it
4In the absence of externalities, i.e., when xi(Π) = xi(Π0) for each i and each Π and Π0 such that the
atoms to which i belongs are the same in both partitions, these problems of coalition formation have
been referred to as “hedonic games.” Thus, our problem could be referred to as an hedonic game with
externalities.
5This impression is conﬁrmed by our two other solutions. If a coalition structure Π belongs to our
second or third solution, and S is strictly dominant, then S ∈ Π.
7is obtained by the iterative formation of strictly dominant coalitions. Clearly, a strictly
dominant partition often fails to exist, but if there is one such partition, then it is unique.
(ii) The core is our second solution to the coalition formation stage. A coalition S
blocks a partition Π0 if xi(Π) > xi(Π0) for each i ∈ S and each partition Π that contains S.
The core is the set of partitions that are not blocked by any coalition. Instead of trying
to determine the partition that will form, we eliminate those that are unstable. We want
to eliminate with conﬁdence and this is why we require the members of the objecting
coalitions to be better oﬀ whatever the other players do after the deviation.6 Any other
expectation when considering the formation of an objecting coalition would lead to a
smaller core. If there is a strictly dominant partition, then this is the only partition in
the core. When there is no such partition, then the core may be empty (Shenoy (1979,
example 7.5)) or may contain more than one partition.
(iii) The third solution we suggest is based on a speciﬁc non-cooperative scenario of
coalition formation. Fix an order π for the players in N. Following the order π, each player
i ∈ N announces a coalition S that contains i. The outcome of this sequential move game
of perfect information is a coalition structure, in which a coalition S forms if and only if
each player in S has announced the coalition S. If there is a strictly dominant partition,
then this is the equilibrium outcome for every order of the players. The proposed coalition
formation game is a ﬁnite horizon extensive form of perfect information. It admits at
least one subgame perfect equilibrium7 and it is “almost always” unique.8 On the other
hand, the equilibrium outcome may depend on the ordering of the players.
3.3 Ineﬃciency and its Causes
We are now ready to draw some qualitative conclusions about the outcomes of our two-
stage cooperation process. Our ﬁrst observation is that ineﬃciency may be entirely due
to the presence of externalities in some situations.
Example 3 This example features prominently in Maskin (2003). A similar example
was ﬁrst proposed by Ray and Vohra (1999, Example 1.2). It describes a simple “free
rider” problem created by a public good that can be produced by each two-player coali-
tion. The set of agents is N = {a,b,c}, and the partition function is: v(N) = 24;
v({a,b}) = 12; v({a,c}) = 13; v({b,c}) = 14; v({i},{{i},{j,k}}) = 9 for all i,j,k;
v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.
Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisfy (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency and Weak
(S,Π)-Marginality, for each embedded coalition (S,Π). Externalities are symmetric in
v and the analysis presented in Subsection 3.1 thus implies that the payoﬀs in each
coalition structure are: x({N}) = (7.5,8,8.5); x({a},{b,c}) = (9,7,7); x({b},{a,c}) =
(6.5,9,6.5); x({c},{a,b}) = (6,6,9); x({a},{b},{c}) = (0,0,0).
6Such a construction is reminiscent of the maximin (or α-) representations of games in strategic form.
7Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes associated to this class of bargaining procedures
do not necessarily belong to the core (as the core may be empty).
8If each player’s payoﬀs at the terminal nodes are diﬀerent, then there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, which yields the backwards induction outcome.
8There is no strictly dominant partition. The core of the coalition formation problem
is
{{N},{{a},{b,c}},{{b},{a,c}},{{c},{a,b}}}.
Apart from each of the three partitions containing a two-player coalition and the free
rider as a singleton, the grand coalition is also stable because of our very conservative
deﬁnition of blocking: an individual player does not block because he is afraid of the
“incredible threat” posed by the two-player coalition, i.e., that they will not cooperate
after he leaves. Our third solution takes care of this. Whatever the order π, the coalition
structure predicted by the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has the ﬁrst mover alone
in his singleton coalition, rationally anticipating that after he chooses to be alone, the
other two will join together in the two-player coalition, as will surely happen. Of course,
the speciﬁc coalition structure that emerges from the sequential game depends on the
order, which assigns diﬀerent bargaining power to players as a function of how early they
speak in the game: each of the partitions containing a two-player coalition is the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome of the game for a given ordering. On the other hand, v
is superadditive, and hence the eﬃcient coalition structure is the grand coalition. The
outcome of our two-stage cooperation process admits ineﬃcient partitions (and in the
case of the sequential game, it consists exclusively of ineﬃcient partitions).
Consider now the modiﬁed partition function v0 where the only change with respect to
v is that the agents do not beneﬁt from positive externalities:
v
0({i},{{i},{j,k}}) = v
0({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.
This is a characteristic function. Hence the outcomes obtained by applying the list of
values (σ(S,Π)) must coincide with the Shapley value of the reduced characteristic functions.
We have: x0({N}) = (7.5,8,8.5); x0({a},{b,c}) = (0,7,7); x0({b},{a,c}) = (6.5,0,6.5);
x0({c},{a,b}) = (6,6,0); x0({a},{b},{c}) = (0,0,0).
The eﬃcient coalition structure, {N}, is now strictly dominant and is thus expected
to be the outcome of most scenarios of coalition formation in the ﬁrst stage. We con-
clude that ineﬃciency may be entirely attributed to the presence of externalities in some
situations.
But externalities are not the only cause of ineﬃciency:
Example 4 Let N = {a,b,c} be the set of agents and let v be the following characteristic
function: v(N) = 18; v({a,b}) = 16; v({a,c}) = 14; v({b,c}) = 12; v({i}) = 0 for all i.
The outcomes obtained by applying a list of values (σ(S,Π)) that satisfy (S,Π)-Anonymity,
(S,Π)-Eﬃciency and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality, must coincide with the Shapley value
of the reduced characteristic functions. We have: x({N}) = (7,6,5); x({a},{b,c}) =
(0,6,6); x({b},{a,c}) = (7,0,7); x({c},{a,b}) = (8,8,0); x({a},{b},{c}) = (0,0,0).
The coalition structure {{a,b},{c}} is strictly dominant (ﬁrst eliminate {a,b} and
then {c}). Hence it is also the unique core partition and it is the outcome of our third
solution, for the six possible orderings of the players. Yet v is superadditive and hence
the grand coalition is the only eﬃcient outcome.
9We close this subsection by oﬀering one more example that illustrates the relevance
of externalities in determining the outcome of the cooperation process, and its eﬃciency.
Indeed, we will see that the application of distinct values that diﬀer only in the way
that externalities are taken into account to determine payoﬀs may lead to very diﬀerent
predictions in terms of the coalitions that form in the ﬁrst stage.
Example 5 Consider a variant of Example 3, in which player a is the only agent capable
of free-riding from a two-player coalition, receiving a worth of 9, as before, when coalition
{b,c} gets together. However,
v({b},{{b},{a,c}}) = v({c},{{c},{a,b}}) = 0.
Let us focus for simplicity on a subclass of values σ(S,Π) that satisfy (S,Π)-Anonymity,
(S,Π)-Eﬃciency and (S,Π)-Monotonicity, for each embedded coalition (S,Π), namely
those that can be derived through Macho-Stadler et al. (2006, 2007) average approach.
Externalities matter only when the three players decide to bargain all together in the grand
coalition. Fix α ∈ [0,1]. Then σα(v) = Sh(vα), where vα is the ﬁctitious characteristic
function deﬁned as follows: vα({i}) = αv({i},{{i},{j,k}})+(1−α)v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}),
vα(S) = v(S,Π) for any other S. Simple computations lead to the following payoﬀ
conﬁguration: xα({N}) = (7.5 + 3α,8 − 1.5α,8.5 − 1.5α); xα({a},{b,c}) = (9,7,7);
xα({b},{a,c}) = (6.5,0,6.5); xα({c},{a,b}) = (6,6,0); xα({a},{b},{c}) = (0,0,0).
The grand coalition is strictly dominant if and only if α ∈]1/2,2/3[. Otherwise,
other ineﬃcient coalition structures are likely to form in some circumstances. For two
extreme examples, consider α = 0 or 1. In the latter case, the coalition {b,c} is dominant
(not strictly for agent c). In the former case, the core is the set of partitions {N} and
{{a},{b,c}}. In the sequential game, the equilibrium is the latter partition if player a is
the ﬁrst mover, but it is the grand coalition otherwise.
3.4 Suﬃcient Conditions for Eﬃciency
If the surplus to share when everyone cooperates is large enough, then one expects the
grand coalition to be eﬃcient, and actually to form. We present two results that conﬁrm
this intuition. Needless to say, the suﬃcient conditions to guarantee overall eﬃciency are
rather restrictive, given the robust examples presented in the previous subsection.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency
and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality. Consider a partition function that can be decomposed into





s , for each embedded coalition (S,Π), and
2. v is convex: v(S0) − v(S0 \ {i}) ≥ v(S) − v(S \ {i}) for each i, S, S0 such that
i ∈ S ( S0, and
3. either all the inequalities appearing in 1, or all the inequalities appearing in 2, are
strict,
10then {N} is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure, and it is strictly dominant.
Proof: Condition 1 implies that the grand coalition is eﬃcient for u. Indeed, let Π =
















It is not diﬃcult to check that convexity implies superadditivity for v. Hence the grand
coalition is eﬃcient for v. Condition 3 then implies that the grand coalition is the only
eﬃcient coalition structure for u + v.
Proposition 1 implies that
xi(Π) = σ
(S,Π)














for each i ∈ S, and each S ⊆ N, where v0 is the characteristic function deﬁned by
v0(S0) = v(S0 ∩ S), for each S0 ⊆ N. Though a bit tedious, this property can be checked
via the formula of the Shapley value.
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0) − v(S
0 \ {i})
for each S0 ⊆ N that contains i. Monotonicity for the Shapley value implies that
Sh
S






The inequality is strict, if v is strictly convex.
Combining equation (2) with conditions 1 and 3 from the statement, we conclude that
{N} is strictly dominant. 
Two particular cases of interest are obtained by taking either u or v as the null
partition function. We also remark that condition 3 is important for Proposition 3 to
hold. For example, suppose v(S) = s for every S ⊆ N. For this characteristic function,
every partition is in the core and is supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
coalition formation game.
If the partition function cannot be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric partition
and a characteristic function, then the bounds of Proposition 2 can prove useful to obtain
suﬃcient conditions for eﬃciency.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency
and (S,Π)-Monotonicity. If the partition function v is such that
ν
(S,Π)
i (v) < µ
(N,{N})
i (v), (3)
for each member i of S, and each embedded coalition (S,Π), then {N} is the unique
eﬃcient coalition structure, and it is strictly dominant.



























Hence the grand coalition is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure. The rest of the proof
follows from Proposition 2 and equation 3. 
Remember that the grand coalition was not always strictly dominant in Example 5.
An ineﬃcient coalition structure was a plausible outcome for some monotonic values.
Using the bounds as calculated in de Clippel and Serrano (2008), Proposition 4 implies
that in that example the grand coalition is strictly dominant for any monotonic value if
v(N) > 28.5, or if v({b,c}) < 9.5.
3.5 Related Literature
The resolution of the second stage of our cooperation process (cf. Subsection 3.1) is
inspired by Aumann and Dr` eze’s (1974, Section 3) adaptation of the Shapley value to
characteristic functions with an existing coalition structure. They reproduce in Section
12.6 an informal argument due to Michael Maschler to determine endogenously the coali-
tion structure that forms. They observe that the ﬁnal outcome may be ineﬃcient for some
superadditive characteristic functions. Example 4 formalizes and strengthens that obser-
vation, showing that an ineﬃcient partition may be strictly dominant. In this context,
Proposition 3 oﬀers an interesting suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency. Our contribution
is also to extend this methodology to problems with externalities. To the best of our
knowledge, Shenoy (1979) is the only paper that studies this two-stage cooperation pro-
cess for characteristic functions. He introduces a dynamic solution to discuss situations
where the core of the coalition formation game is empty. He studies the properties of -
and relations that may exist between - the core and the dynamic solution, for diﬀerent
solutions of the second stage. His analysis of the Shapley value (see his Section 7) focuses
mainly on “simple games.”
In this paper we followed the idea that players have no option to argue in favor of
a larger payoﬀ by appealing to cooperative opportunities with players with whom they
decided not to bargain. Of course alternative scenarios may be relevant as well. Along
these lines, Hart and Kurz (1983) propose to apply the Owen value once a coalition
structure is formed. By deﬁnition, outcomes are always eﬃcient in their cooperation
process, since coalitions are interpreted as unions that form to get a better share of the
total proﬁt. Even though they focus only on characteristic functions, some externalities
exist when the coalitions form, as a consequence of the deﬁnition of the Owen value.
Their paper contains a discussion of the core, based on diﬀerent possible reactions of the
players left behind after the formation of a blocking coalition.
12More recent papers focus on the problem of coalition formation, leaving the second
stage of the cooperation process as a black box. Each player derives some utility from
his membership to the diﬀerent coalitions. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) study the
existence of core stable partitions and other weaker notions of stability. Banerjee et al.
(2001) introduce the concept of top coalition (similar to our concept of strict dominance
when there are no externalities) to prove the non-emptiness of the core in some economic
applications; see also Alcalde and Revilla (2004). Proposition 3, applied to the case u = 0,
could be added to that list of applications that admit a strictly dominant partition.
The problem of coalition formation for partition functions, or more generally for
games with strategic externalities, has been the subject of a growing literature over the
past few years; see Bloch (2002). Bloch (1996) for instance studies a speciﬁc bargaining
procedure to solve the ﬁrst stage of the cooperation process, while the second stage is
solved by a ﬁxed arbitrary division rule (hence adding the possibility of externalities
to the hedonic games). Many other authors focus on speciﬁc bargaining procedures to
simultaneously determine the coalitions that form and the distribution of the surplus (Ray
and Vohra (1999), Montero (1999), and of course Maskin (2003)). Ray and Vohra (2001)
study a core-like solution, assuming that only subcoalitions can block. Our observation
that ineﬃciency may be due entirely to the presence of externalities (see Example 3)
conﬁrms similar conclusions previously obtained in these diﬀerent frameworks. Given the
complexity of some of these models, attention is often restricted to symmetric partition
functions. Proposition 3 is a result of that type when v equals 0.
It is important to emphasize though that all these results on the eﬃciency of the
“equilibrium” outcomes strongly depend on the type of cooperation process one considers.
One can construct cooperation processes that lead to an eﬃcient outcome with or without
externalities, and one can construct other bargaining processes that lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes only in the presence of externalities. In the end, the interest of the diﬀerent
results should be judged on their robustness and on the appeal of the cooperation process
under study. In scenarios in which players recognize that it may be in their best interest
to restrict the set of players with whom to negotiate when there is an ex-ante commitment
to a known distribution rule, robust conclusions were sought here.
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